Research 


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  1. Political Repression in Autocratic Regimes, 2017 Journal of Comparative Economics, 45(2): 410-428 (with V. Bove and J-P. Platteau)
  2. The Timing of Contests, 2017 Defence and Peace Economics 28: 137-149,  (joint with G. Grandjean)
  3. Self-Containment: Achieving Peace in Anarchic Settings, 2017. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61: 173-203 (joint with  A. Adam)
  4. "Oil Above Water": Economic Interdependence and Third Party Intervention, 2016. Journal of Conflict Resolution60(7): p. 1251-1277 (joint work with V. Bove and K.S.Gleditsch) - meaning of the title
  5. State Power, State Capacity, and Development, 2015. Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy (proceedings), 21(4): 553-560
  6. Growth-Friendly Dictatorships, 2015. Journal of Comparative Economics 43: 98-111 (joint G. De Luca and A. Litina)
  7. U.S. Security Strategy and the Gains from Bilateral Trade, 2014. Review of International Economics, 22(5): 863-885 (joint work with V. Bove and L. Elia)
  8. The Tragedy of the Commons in a Violent World, 2014. RAND Journal of Economics, 45(3): 521-532, working paper version
  9. Mineral Resources and Conflict in DRC: a Case of Ecological Fallacy, 2014. Oxford Economic Papers, 66(3): 721-749 (joint with G. De Luca, J-F Maystadt, and J. Ulimwengu)
  10. Deterrence in Contests, 2013. Economica, 80 (317): 171-189 (joint with G. De Luca) working paper version (older title)
  11. Politics and Insurgencies, 2012. Economics and Politics, 24(2): 157-181 (joint with K. Siqueira)
  12. Land Inequality and Conflict Intensity, 2012. Public Choice, 150(1): 119-135 (joint work with G. De Luca)
  13. Endogenous Elites: Power Structure and Patron Client Relationships, 2011. Economics of Governance, 12: 237-258
  14. Land Inequality and Conflict Intensity in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2011. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy: Vol. 16 : Iss. 2, Article 10
  15. On the Feasibility of Power and Status Ranking in Traditional Setups, 2010. Journal of Comparative Economics, 38 (3): 267-282 (joint work with J-P Platteau)

Contributions to collective work

1. Sekeris, P.G. (2017). Counter-Elite, in The Sage Encyclopedia of Political Behavior. ed. Fathali M. Moghaddam

Working Papers


This article investigates contests when heterogenous players compete to obtain a rent share. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium when players have general preferences. Our results show that the conventional wisdom in contest - such as a monotonically increasing relationship between effort and the size of the rent - may no longer hold. We derive the key conditions on preferences under which this is the case. By providing a much broader contest environment, our approach is able to nest conventional contest analysis as well as providing a rich framework that helps to explain many puzzling applications.

While folk theorems for dynamic renewable common pool resource games sustain cooperation as an equilibrium, the possibility of reverting to violence to appropriate the resource destroys the incentives to cooperate because of the expectation of conflict when resources are sufficiently depleted. In this paper we show with experimental evidence that agents behave according to the theoretical predictions. For high stocks of resources when conflict is a highly costly activity, participants cooperate less than in the control group, and they play the non-cooperative action with higher frequency. This comes as a consequence of the (correct) anticipation that when resources run low, the conflict option is used by a large share of participants.

We propose a model where an autocrat rules over an ethnically divided society. The dictator selects the tax rate over domestic production and the nation's natural resources to maximize his rents under the threat of a regime-switching revolution. We show that a weak ruler may let the country plunge in civil war to increase his personal rents. Inter-group fighting weakens potential opposition to the ruler, thereby allowing him to increase fiscal pressure. We show that the presence of natural resources exacerbates the incentives of the ruler to promote civil confjict for his own profit, especially if the resources are unequally distributed across ethnic groups. We validate the main predictions of the model using cross-country data over the period 1960-2007, and show that our empirical results are not likely to be driven by omitted observable determinants of civil war incidence or by unobservable country-specific heterogeneity.

We demonstrate that entry in a Common Pool Resource problem may be Pareto-superior, and therefore welcomed by active players already exploiting the common resource. Entry reduces the marginal utility of production effort to the active players, and thereby incentivizes them all to constrain their own production. The resulting reduced levels of externalities eventually leaves all players better off.



Work in Progress

  • The Role of Markets and Preferences on Resource Conflict (joint work with A. Dickson and I. MacKenzie)
  • Dauphins or Sharks? Dynastic Rulers and Natural Resource Exploitation (joint with V. Bove and L. Elia)
  • Inequality in a Repeated Joint Project (joint with O. Dagnelie and F. Valognes)
  • Partial Delegation

Non-Academic Publications

 
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