Research







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2012 2011
2010

Working Papers

The present paper provides a spatially-nuanced view on the role of mineral resources in civil wars in the particular case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). We estimate the impact of geo-located new mining concessions on the number of conflict events between January 1997 and December 2008. Instrumenting the variable of interest with historical concessions interacted with changes in mineral international prices, we unveil an ecological fallacy. Concessions have no effect on the number of conflicts at the territory level (lowest administrative unit), while they foster violence at the district level (higher administrative unit). We develop a theoretical model where the incentives of armed groups to exploit and protect mineral resources explain our empirical findings. A spatial analysis of the effect of mining concessions on conflict backs our proposed theoretical explanation.
Our paper explores the economic conditions that lead third parties to join ongoing internal wars. We  start by developing a formal model that ties together the main economic forces driving the decision to interfere in a civil war and the potential costs associated with such choice. We predict that third party interventions are  most likely in civil conflicts where the country at war harbours a highly profitable industry as a consequence of its important market power on international markets, of the high world demand for this good, and of the high legal state capacity. The host countries' marginal productivity of workers and the opposition forces' strength reduces the likelihood of intervention. We also present novel empirical results on the role of oligopolistic goods, i.e. oil, and state stability in prompting third party military intervention using a dataset on intrastate conflicts in the period 1960-1999.

We propose a model where an autocrat rules over an ethnically divided society. The dictator selects the tax rate over domestic production and the nation's natural resources to maximize his rents under the threat of a regime-switching revolution. We show that a weak ruler may let the country plunge in civil war to increase his personal rents. Inter-group fighting weakens potential opposition to the ruler, thereby allowing him to increase fiscal pressure. We show that the presence of natural resources exacerbates the incentives of the ruler to promote civil confjict for his own profit, especially if the resources are unequally distributed across ethnic groups. We validate the main predictions of the model using cross-country data over the period 1960-2007, and show that our empirical results are not likely to be driven by omitted observable determinants of civil war incidence or by unobservable country-specific heterogeneity.
In anarchic settings, the potential rivals are dragged in an arms race that can degenerate in an open war out of mutual suspicion. We propose a novel commitment device for contestants to avoid both arming and fighting. We allow the players to decentralize the two core decisions that determine whether peace or war ensues. While in centralized countries the decision makers are unable to credibly communicate to their foe their willingness not to arm and not to attack, where the two decisions are dissociated there exists scope for not arming with certainty, and hence overcoming the commitment problem that makes war otherwise inevitable. Using data on the 1975-2001 period, we provide evidence that in countries where the head of the state or the defense minister are military ocers, the likelihood of observing an international conflictis higher.
We develop a two-period rent seeking model with endogenous military investment decisions and shifting combat efficiencies. For peace to obtain it is required that the armies’ relative fighting efficiency remains rather constant accross time and that the adequation between wealth and strength is respected. Delay in conflict may occur if the future assaillant’s fighting efficiency is sufficiently improved, and if the future victim is wealthy enough. Moreover, we distinguish disputes aiming at modifying the status quo from preventive wars.